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Abstract:
We explore the influence of tacit routines in obtaining coordination.  Our experiment uses simple 
laboratory “firms,” in which we interfere with one kind of firm’s ability to develop tacit routines.  
Thus, our firms vary in the degree to which they rely on this kind of knowledge – instead of 
other, explicit, mechanisms – for obtaining coordination.  We find that interfering with the 
development of tacit routines harms firms’ ability to coordinate.  We then explore the extent to 
which firms are able to transfer their ability to coordinate activity, either to a new domain or to 
new members.  Our results indicate that tacit routines transfer more easily than other 
mechanisms to a new, but closely related, domain.  However, routine-based firms perform 
slightly worse in their ability to incorporate new members.
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1Organizational actors often confront tasks in which coordinated action is important 
(March and Simon 1958, Thompson 1967, Camerer and Knez 1997).  Perhaps the simplest such 
tasks are those in which the actions of employees need to correspond to the directives of 
managers.  For instance, a manager may receive private information about an exogenous variable 
(characteristics of products demanded by consumers) and issue a directive on how employees 
should act (which characteristics to emphasize in development, marketing, or sales).  
Coordination and efficiency are obtained when employees act in a manner consistent with each 
other’s actions, the manager’s intentions, and the information about the exogenous variable.
While the abstract problem of matching employees’ actions with a manager’s directives 
may seem trivial, it is often quite difficult to obtain efficient coordination in practice, even in 
simple tasks with small numbers of possible actions and individuals (Mehta et al. 1994; Van 
Huyck et al. 1990) and even when there is communication from a manager about what action to 
take (Weber et al. 2001).  Thus, understanding how organizational actors coordinate their 
behavior is important for understanding the mechanisms underlying organizational efficiency.
While communication can play a role in aiding coordination (Marschak and Radner 1972,
Arrow 1974, Daft and Lengel 1986, Blume and Ortmann 2005), the knowledge shared by 
members of a group or firm can also be critically important and may influence the need for 
communication.  When members have little shared knowledge, a large amount of communication 
is required to coordinate activity, but less communication is needed when members share a large 
body of knowledge (Arrow 1974, Cremer 1993).  Thus, shared knowledge – for instance, of what 
a firm has done in the past or of “programmed” practices for facilitating coordination – may be a 
substitute for communication in achieving coordination (Argote 1982, Weber 2006; see also, 
Schelling 1960).
2Given the importance of shared knowledge in facilitating coordination, it is important to 
note that not all knowledge in organizations is the same.  Organizational scholars note that 
knowledge varies in the extent to which it is explicit or codifiable, and that this also applies to 
knowledge shared among firm members (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994, Nonaka 1991, 1994,
Winter 1987, Zander and Kogut 1995, Lam 2000).1  In particular, several scholars divide 
knowledge jointly held by firm members into explicit (codifiable) shared knowledge and implicit
shared knowledge, frequently referred to as tacit routines.
In this paper, we explore the use of tacit routines – in contrast to other mechanisms such 
as communication and explicit shared knowledge – in solving coordination problems.  To do so, 
we create simple laboratory “firms,” whose only function is to solve coordination problems 
requiring correspondence between a manager’s private information and the actions of several 
employees, and limit one kind of firm’s ability to develop tacit routines.  Thus, we develop firms 
that differ in the extent to which they rely on tacit routines (“routine-intensive” firms), versus 
other mechanisms (“routine-restricted” firms), for coordination.  We explore how these firms 
differ in their ability to solve simple coordination problems, and also in the extent to which they 
are able to transfer such ability to new domains and individuals.  
Communication, Explicit Knowledge and Tacit Routines
We explore the use of shared knowledge in coordinating activity, noting that there are 
two kinds of shared knowledge that firm members develop through repeated interaction.  We 
focus on the distinction between explicit, codifiable, or declarative knowledge (henceforth 
“explicit knowledge”) and tacit, routine-based, or procedural knowledge (henceforth “tacit 
                                                
1 This general distinction has also been noted by philosophers (Polanyi 1966), psychologists (Anderson 1982, 
Singley and Anderson 1989), organizational researchers (von Hippel 1988, Cohen 1991, Walsh and Ungson 1991, 
Kogut and Zander 1992) and economists (Hayek 1945, Nelson 1982). 
3routines”).  This distinction – noted previously by organizational and economic scholars (e.g.,
Winter 1987, Nonaka 1994, Zander and Kogut 1995) – is important for understanding sources of 
organizational efficiency, particularly when coordination among individuals is important
(Nonaka 1991, Cohen and Bacdayan 1994).  Moreover, we focus only on the kind of knowledge 
that is shared among firm members, and is therefore useful for solving coordination problems.2
To be precise, in this paper explicit knowledge corresponds to the codifiable body of 
publicly held knowledge among firm members that assists in coordination.  For instance, 
employees in a firm may receive guidelines (e.g., manuals, training, or explicit instruction) on 
how to respond to managers’ directives, and employees can refer to this body of explicit, shared 
knowledge whenever they need to infer management’s desired action.  As another example, a 
manager and employee may meet regularly to reach explicit agreement about which activities the 
employee will perform following different directives from the manager.  A key feature of this 
kind of knowledge is that it is closely related to the use of communication.  For instance, both 
communication and the use of explicit shared knowledge solve coordination problems through 
the establishment of explicit agreement regarding behavior.  Moreover, establishing the kinds of 
guidelines or explicit agreement discussed above usually requires communication between 
people in the firm, and the more communication in which they engage, the more likely such 
explicit knowledge is to develop (Nonaka 1991).
In our framework, tacit routines refer to the implicit knowledge or unstated shared 
agreement between firm members regarding how to take actions in a manner likely to produce 
successful coordination.  This kind of knowledge corresponds to jointly held perspectives, 
procedures and patterns of behavior that arise through repeated interaction, but which are 
                                                
2 Lam (2000) provides a classification of knowledge types that is useful for our purposes.  She distinguishes 
knowledge on two dimensions: epistemological (explicit vs. tacit) and ontological (individual vs. collective).  We 
focus on the distinction between explicit collective (shared) knowledge and tacit collective (shared) knowledge.
4independent of explicit communication or codification.  For instance, an employee may learn 
which types of activities a manager prioritizes, by having worked together for a long time and 
without any explicit discussion of the manager’s tendencies.  Similarly, an employee may 
develop an understanding of the particular order or manner in which a manager likes to receive 
or dispense different kinds of information, without either ever explicitly discussing this.  While 
this kind of shared knowledge may not require communication to develop, as explicit knowledge 
does – and firm members may not even possess awareness of tacit routines – it still requires a 
shared history of repeated performance of near identical activities (Gersick and Hackman 1990, 
Nonaka 1994). 
In solving coordination problems, both kinds of knowledge are important, but they are 
also substitutes for the use of communication.3  Firm members can coordinate activity between 
each other with very little shared knowledge, but this likely requires a great deal of 
communication.  On the other hand, if firm members possess a great deal of shared knowledge –
of either kind – then significantly less communication is required to achieve coordination.  
Coordination and Tacit Routines
In this paper, we explore the influence of tacit routines on coordination, using simple 
laboratory firms.  We do so by interfering with one kind of firm’s ability to develop this kind of 
shared knowledge.  As a result, these firms must rely more heavily on communication and 
explicit knowledge.  In the appendix, we provide a formal theoretical illustration of how limiting 
a firm’s ability to develop tacit routines, in a production task similar to that in our experiments, 
can produce greater reliance on communication and a larger body of shared explicit knowledge.
                                                
3 Arrow (1974), Nelson and Winter (1982), Cremer (1993), Wernerfelt (2003), and Cremer et al. (2005) also discuss 
the efficiency-enhancing nature of shared knowledge in facilitating coordination, and how this relates to the use of 
communication.
5We motivate our work with three simple hypotheses.
First, we predict that interfering with firms’ ability to develop tacit routines will harm 
their ability to solve coordination problems and will force them to rely more heavily on 
communication and explicit knowledge.  That is, in our task – where the only thing firms do is 
coordinate activity – we predict routine-restricted firms will produce lower earnings and require 
more communication than routine-intensive firms.
We then explore how the induced difference influences firms’ ability to cope with two 
kinds of change.  More precisely, we explore whether routine-intensive or routine-restricted
firms are better at dealing with situations in which it is necessary to transfer knowledge in order 
to continue to successfully solve coordination problems.
The first kind of change corresponds to the firm entering a new domain, where the basic
features of the coordination problem remain the same, but the domain over which such 
coordination must occur changes.4  In this case, the firm must perform the same task as before 
(coordinating the manager’s exogenous private information with employees’ actions), but in a 
new context.  Based on previous research we anticipate that tacit routines will transfer to the new 
context, due to high similarity between what the firm does in both cases, but that domain-specific 
explicit coordination mechanisms (i.e., shared explicit knowledge) will not (Berry and Broadbent 
1987, Gersick and Hackman 1990, Cohen and Bacdayan 1994, Darr and Kurtzberg 2000).  Thus, 
we predict routine-intensive firms will perform better than routine-restricted firms in 
transferring knowledge to a new closely related domain.
In the other kind of change, we introduce a new employee.  This corresponds to a 
situation in which a firm grows by adding new individuals, thus requiring transfer of knowledge 
                                                
4 For instance, a firm may enter a new geographical or consumer market for its product (or introduce a new closely 
related product).  Alternatively, a service firm might regularly deal with new clients, in which case the basic features 
of what the firm does remain unchanged, but the precise domain over which activity must be coordinated differs.
6to the new member.  In this case, we anticipate that transfer will be nearly impossible for tacit 
routines, which are difficult to transfer to new individuals if not accompanied by explicit 
information (Weber 2006).  However, we anticipate new employees will find it easier to access 
the explicit coordination mechanisms, relied on more heavily by routine-restricted firms, which 
are codifiable and therefore easier to transmit without shared experience (Nanaka 1991, 1994, 
Grant 1996, Argote and Ingram 2000, Lam 2000).  Thus, we predict new employee performance
to be better in routine-restricted firms than in routine-intensive firms.
Coordination and Tacit Routines in Laboratory Firms
Our experiment utilizes laboratory “firms” that perform a very simple task: a manager 
must convey privately observed information to several employees so that they can act in a 
manner coordinated with each other and with the manager’s private information.  More 
precisely, groups of participants in our experiment perform the picture-naming task introduced 
by Weber and Camerer (2003) to examine how firms develop shared knowledge useful for 
solving coordination problems. 
In the laboratory task, a group of participants is presented with a set of pictures that they 
must jointly identify (cf. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Schober and Clark 1989).  Specifically, a 
manager with access to private information (the appropriate pictures) must convey this 
information to employees (by describing the pictures) and the employees must respond with the 
action desired by the manager (selecting the appropriate pictures).  To perform this task with as 
few mistakes as possible, the firm can rely on a combination of communication and shared
knowledge.  However, since communication is costly – it takes time – the firm can perform 
7better by developing shared knowledge (both explicit knowledge and tacit routines) and 
substituting away from the use of communication.5
The only jointly held explicit knowledge with which members begin the task is common 
knowledge of the English language and perhaps a few other jointly held declarative facts.6  
However, through repeated communication they develop explicit knowledge, in the form of a 
precise code or jointly agreed upon set of terms that uniquely identify each of the pictures.  As 
the task continues, they develop an improved body of explicit knowledge matching words or 
phrases to pictures.7
Similarly, firm members begin the task with a very limited set of jointly held tacit 
routines, such as basic implicit communication procedures (like allowing the manager to speak 
first).8  However, through repeated interaction firm members develop tacit routines useful for 
identifying the pictures.  For instance, employees may develop tacit understanding that the 
manager tends to refer to pictures primarily based on one kind of feature or begin with a 
particular area on the pictures.  Managers and employees may also develop certain tacit 
communication routines to aid their ability to coordinate.9
                                                
5 Weber and Camerer (2003) utilize this shared knowledge as a metaphor for organizational culture.  More precisely, 
an experiment demonstrates that two groups independently developing shared knowledge (both tacit and explicit) 
over the same sets of pictures have a difficult time integrating their unique knowledge when merged.  The fact that 
this difficulty is unanticipated and that individuals blame members of the other group for such difficulties parallels 
similarities between the integration of two groups with different shared knowledge in the laboratory and the 
integration of distinct organizational cultures following a merger.
6 For instance, one of the firms in Weber and Camerer (2003) consisted of two people who both had taken a class 
from the same professor, and they remembered his name.  This initial shared explicit knowledge proved valuable in 
performing the task – they ended up referring to one of the pictures by this professor’s name (because they jointly 
recognized a resemblance between someone in the picture and the professor).
7 In the Weber and Camerer experiments this knowledge was clearly explicit since participants asked at the end of 
the experiment to write down the list of codes were able to do so without difficulty or much disagreement within 
firms (beyond minor semantics).  
8 An example of such implicit communication routines, held widely among members of a population, can be seen in 
differences between how time is generally described in communication by English (vertically) and Mandarin 
(horizontally) speakers (Boroditsky 2001).
9 For example, in the Weber and Camerer experiments, firms developed tacit conventions such as focusing on what 
people were wearing or how many people were in each picture.  Also in those experiments, firms differed 
substantially in how the employees affirmed that they had understood the manager’s directive – in some cases 
8Thus, while firm members begin their interaction with limited amounts of either kind of 
shared knowledge, and therefore initially rely heavily on communication, repeatedly performing 
the task increases the amount of both kinds of jointly held knowledge.  As a result, managers and 
employees improve their ability to coordinate while minimizing the need for communication.10
Since both kinds of knowledge are helpful in solving coordination problems, it is useful 
to understand how they each impact firms’ ability to coordinate.  However, separating the impact 
of the two kinds of knowledge on performance is difficult.  Most firms develop simultaneously 
both explicit knowledge and tacit routines.  Therefore, it is hard to determine which is primarily 
responsible for improving performance, and it is also hard to determine the effects of a firm’s 
reliance on one kind of knowledge more than the other.  In this paper, we do so by limiting the 
ability of one kind of firm to develop tacit routines.
The development of tacit routines depends on repeated near-identical interaction between 
organizational members.  That is, repeated interaction between individuals, in the same roles, is 
likely to lead to the development of such routines (Gersick and Hackman 1990, Cohen and 
Bacdayan 1994).  Therefore, in our experiment we simply vary whether firm members’ roles 
remain fixed or change from period to period.  Specifically, we vary whether the role of manager 
remains fixed on one participant or rotates among each firm member.11
In firms with fixed roles (routine-intensive firms) members should be easily able to 
develop tacit routines facilitating the performance of the task from one period to the next.  
                                                                                                                                                            
silence indicated agreement, in others an “uh huh” or “got it” was required.  In both cases these differences often led 
to unanticipated conflict in “merged” firms.
10 In the Weber and Camerer experiments firms took an average of 249 seconds (of communication) to complete the 
first period of the task and 48 seconds to complete the 20th period.
11 Our experiments are therefore similar to an earlier line of research that investigated how the structure of an 
organization’s “communication net” affects its ability to perform routines (Bavelas 1950, Bavelas and Barrett 1951, 
Carzo, Jr. and Yanouzas 1969, Christie et al. 1956, Guetzkow and Simon 1955, Leavitt 1951, 1962, Shaw 1954).  
However, unlike this earlier research, varying whether the role of manager remains fixed or rotates in our 
experiment produces no change in how the laboratory task is performed in any period – one participant always 
performs the task as manager while the others serve as employees.  
9Conversely, we interfere with the ability of members of firms with rotating roles (routine-
restricted firms) to develop such routines by forcing them to repeatedly change roles.  As a 
result, we force such firms to rely more heavily on explicit coordination mechanisms 
(communication and shared explicit knowledge).12  Since firms are otherwise identical, this 
distinction allows us to explore the possible influence of the two kinds of knowledge on firm 
performance and the transfer of their knowledge, either to a new domain or a new employee.
Organizational scholars have noted the importance associated with firm knowledge and 
the transfer of such knowledge as a source of competitive advantage (Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Grant 1996, Argote et al. 2000).  However, scholars also note that tacit routines, by their very 
nature, are difficult to observe empirically (Hall 1993, Spender and Grant 1996).  Our work, 
using controlled laboratory experiments in which we can influence the kind of knowledge 
possessed by firms, explores precisely how different kinds of knowledge can yield advantage in 
coordinating activity and in transferring such ability in situations regularly faced by firms.13
Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment consisted of a 2x2 design that varied the type of knowledge developed by 
the firm (routine-intensive vs. routine-restricted) and the type of change the firm underwent after 
                                                
12 The simple model in the appendix illustrates how a firm with weakened ability to develop tacit routines, as in our 
experiment, will compensate by communicating more and developing a greater stock of explicit agreement.
13 This also raises an important caveat to our research: what can we learn about firms from laboratory experiments?  
We acknowledge that our “firms” are very simple, and only do one thing: coordinate activity between a manager and 
several employees.  However, using simple laboratory firms, only engaged in solving coordination problems, allows 
us to address precisely how such coordination is influenced by firms’ knowledge, while controlling for other factors 
usually present outside the laboratory.  Moreover, by using laboratory experiments, we can directly influence the 
development of firms’ knowledge, something impossible to do in naturally-occurring contexts.  Thus, the simplicity 
of the laboratory makes it an ideal environment in which to generate data on laboratory “firms” to complement the 
study of real-world firms.  Of course, using the laboratory to understand processes in real-world firms requires 
sacrificing important features present in such firms (see Weick 1969).  
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the first 20 periods (new domain vs. new employee).  We first describe the general procedures 
utilized over the first 20 periods and then describe treatment differences.  
General procedures for periods 1-20
In every session, four (new domain treatment) or five (new employee treatment) 
participants arrived at the experiment and were randomly-assigned participant numbers (1-4 or 1-
5).  In new employee sessions, the participant who received the number 5 was asked to leave, 
return in 30 minutes, and told that he or she would receive $5 for returning on time.
The (remaining) four participants received instructions on performing the code-
development task.14  They also each received the same eight numbered pictures on four sheets of 
paper.  The pictures were of the same kinds of office environments as those used in Weber and 
Camerer (2003).  Participants were told that in each period there would be a manager and three 
employees.  The manager would see numbers corresponding to four of the pictures and would 
have to try to get the employees to reproduce the ordered list of numbers while only referring to 
the content of the corresponding pictures.
The four participants were seated at tables facing in opposite directions and each received 
a stopwatch.  When a period started, all employees started their stopwatches (the experimenter 
also kept time).  At that point, participants were free to talk back and forth.  Once a particular 
employee wrote down four numbers, he or she stopped the watch and recorded the time.15  Once 
all the employees finished, the experimenter read the correct numbers aloud, and participants 
noted whether the number they had placed in each position was correct, recording the number of 
                                                
14 Instructions can be found online at www.andrew.cmu.edu/~srick.  
15 Once one minute elapsed, the period ended whether or not participants completed identifying all four pictures.  If 
an employee did not identify all four pictures in one minute, the employee earned nothing in that period.  
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mistakes.16  The payoffs to each employee for completing the task in a period were $0.60 minus 
$0.01 for each elapsed second, and a $0.10 per mistake penalty.  The manager received the 
average of the three employees’ earnings.
Firm knowledge treatments
In one half of these sessions (routine-restricted firms) the role of manager changed every
period according to participant numbers (participant 1 was manager in periods 1, 5, 9, etc.).  In 
the remaining sessions (routine-intensive firms) participant 1 was always manager.  
In all sessions, the four participants completed 20 periods of this task, which took about 
25 minutes.  Following period 20, the experimenter read aloud a new set of instructions, which 
differed by the second treatment.
New domain treatment
  After period 20, participants received a new set of eight pictures, also depicting office 
environments.  Participants were told that they would perform another 15 periods of the task in 
the same manner as before, but with the new set of pictures.  Participants then proceeded as 
before for 15 periods.  The role of manager continued to be either fixed or rotating.
New employee treatment
We added to the firm a fifth employee for periods 21 through 35.  Recall that in each 
session of the new employee treatment, five participants initially arrived at the experiment.  The 
                                                
16 The experimenter stood between the participants at all times, from a position where he could easily see if a 
participant was writing when he or she was not supposed to or changing previously written numbers.  This situation 
did not arise. The experimenter also checked participants’ record sheets to determine the manager’s earnings and to 
make sure that recording was accurate and that participants knew how to calculate earnings.
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participant who drew the number 5 was asked to leave and return in 30 minutes.  Upon returning 
to the experiment, participant 5 was asked to wait outside for a few minutes and received a copy 
of the instructions.17  Starting with period 21, participant 5 was always in the role of employee.  
In routine-restricted firms, the role of manager continued to rotate among participants 1 through 
4, while in routine-intensive firms, the role of manager remained with participant 1.  
Participants
Participants were Carnegie Mellon and University of Pittsburgh undergraduate and 
graduate students who had not previously participated in any other experiment involving this 
paradigm.  Participants were recruited from an e-mail list of interested students.  The e-mail 
announcement requested that only participants fluent in spoken English sign up.
We conducted a total of 40 sessions using 184 participants.  Table 1 presents the number 
of sessions and participants by treatment.
Results
In presenting our results, we proceed as follows.  First, we analyze differences in the first 
20 periods in the relative ability of routine-intensive and routine-restricted firms to solve the 
repeated coordination problem.  We then explore the degree to which this ability transfers either 
to the new domain or to the new employee.
Periods 1-20
Figure 1 presents the average earnings, by period and by type of firm, in the first 20 
periods.  As we expected, interfering with one kind of firm’s ability to develop tacit routines 
                                                
17 Before proceeding to period 21, participant 5 had an opportunity to ask questions about the task.
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interferes with those firms’ ability to solve the coordination problem.18  In all periods after the 
first, earnings are higher in routine-intensive firms that in routine-restricted firms.19
The advantage obtained by routine-intensive firms can also be seen in Table 2, which 
presents the results of regressions, using random firm effects, of earnings on period (using the 
natural logarithm of period to account for decreased improvement in performance over time) and 
treatment variables.20  The first regression examines the effect of limiting the development of
tacit routines on firm performance.  Of primary interest is the binary variable Routine-Intensive, 
which is equal to one for routine-intensive firms and zero for routine-restricted firms.  As the 
coefficient on this variable indicates, routine-intensive firms enjoyed a significant advantage in 
performance over the first 20 periods of the experiment.  Thus, limiting the development of tacit 
routines – by limiting the degree to which roles in performing the task are identical across 
periods – clearly hinders performance.
New domain
Figure 2 presents the average earnings of firms in the new domain treatment, for the 15 
periods in which they performed the task with new pictures (periods 21-35).  Pooling across both 
kinds of firms, we find evidence of transfer of coordination ability to the new domain: in Figure 
1 firms start off very close to $0.00, while in Figure 2 they start off very close to $0.30.
                                                
18 The results in the model in the appendix refer to both earnings and communication – the relationship between the 
two is always predicted to be negative, as firms with greater stocks of shared agreement require less communication.  
We find this to strongly be the case.  The correlation, across all periods and firms between time (which measures the 
amount of communication) and firm earnings is -0.97.  Of course, in our experiment, the payoffs are such that 
communication and earnings are very likely to be negatively correlated, as is the case in the model.  For brevity, we 
limit our analysis of the results to firm earnings, but note that an analysis of the amount of communication would 
produce results that are substantively identical, but with opposite signs, thus providing support for our predictions.
19 The lack of a difference in the first period suggests that managers are “myopic” (see model in the appendix), in the 
sense that routine-restricted firm managers are unaware of the greater potential benefits to them – relative to routine-
intensive firms – of using more communication in the first period as an investment in the development of explicit 
agreement.
20 The results are substantively unchanged if we omit the random-effects and instead allow clustering of standard 
errors by firm.
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The figure also reveals that the advantage obtained by routine-intensive firms in periods 
1-20 transfers to the new domain.  A comparison of the average earnings over the first four 
periods – one managerial “cycle” in the routine-restricted firms – reveals significantly higher 
earnings for routine-intensive firms than for routine-restricted ones (routine-intensive: $0.40; 
routine-restricted: $0.30; t14 = 2.97, p = 0.01).
21
The greater ability of routine-intensive firms to coordinate in the new domain can also be 
seen in Table 2, in the second and third regressions.  In both regressions – which vary only in the 
inclusion of period 20 firm earnings as a control in the latter – the coefficient for routine-
intensive firms is positive and significant, indicating that these firms maintain their advantage in 
the new domain.
A more direct test of whether greater transfer occurs in routine-intensive firms can be 
seen in Table 3.  This table reports regressions of average earnings in periods 21 through 24 
(using the firm as the unit of observation), controlling for that firm’s average earnings in periods 
1 through 4.  The first regression demonstrates that how a firm performs in the new domain is 
only slightly related to how it performed initially in the previous domain (the coefficient on 
average period 1 through 4 earnings is marginally significant p = 0.11), but that there is 
significant transfer to the new domain (the coefficient on the constant term is positive).  That is, 
in dealing with the new set of pictures, firms initially perform much better than they did at the 
beginning of the experiment (with the first set of pictures), indicating that they are able to 
transfer some of the shared knowledge developed over the first 20 periods.  The second 
regression shows that this transfer is significantly larger for the routine-intensive firms.
New employee
                                                
21 All p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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  Figure 3 presents the average earnings, across periods 21 through 35, for the participant 
added to the firm in the new employee sessions.  Comparing Figures 1 and 3, we see only very 
slight evidence of transfer to the new employee.  While earnings at the beginning of the 
experiment (Figure 1) began close to $0.00, the average earnings for the new employee begin 
close to $0.04.  However, the increase in earnings across time (i.e., the slope of the lines) appears 
to be larger in Figure 3 than in Figure 1 – e.g., by period 25, new employees average earnings are 
around $0.38, while they are only about $0.24 by period 5 in Figure 1 – providing some evidence 
of transfer of coordination ability to the new employee.
The figure reveals only slightly better initial performance for the new employee in the 
routine-restricted firms, as we had expected.  While average earnings in the first four periods 
(21-24) are higher for routine-restricted firms ($0.23) than for routine-intensive firms ($0.19), 
this difference does not reach standard significance levels (t22 = 1.53, p = 0.14).  Looking at 
Table 2, we similarly see only slightly – and insignificantly – better performance by the new 
employee in the routine-restricted firms than in the routine-intensive ones.22
In Table 3, we see that firms are able to transfer some of their coordination ability to the 
new employee (in the first four periods).  That is, the coefficient for the constant is positive and 
statistically significant when we pool the two kinds of firms (third regression).  However, this 
transfer is only slightly smaller for routine-intensive firms, and the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero (p = 0.16).
Conclusion
                                                
22 We can alternatively assess new employees’ relative performance by computing the ratio of their earnings to the 
average earnings of the original employees in their firm.  The ratio in periods 21-24 is greater in routine-restricted 
firms (0.59) than in routine-intensive firms (0.44), though not significantly so (t22 = 1.66, p = 0.11).  However, the 
ratio in periods 21-35 does differ significantly between routine-restricted and routine-intensive firms (0.87 vs. 0.74; 
t22 = 1.95, p < 0.07).
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This paper uses experiments on simple laboratory firms to understand the role of tacit 
routines in coordinating organizational activity, relative to other explicit coordination 
mechanisms such as communication and shared explicit agreement.  We find that interfering 
with the development of tacit routines harms firms’ ability to solve simple coordination 
problems.  Specifically, routine-restricted firms, whose ability to develop tacit routines we 
interfered with, produced lower earnings and required more communication to complete the 
picture-naming task than did routine-intensive firms, who suffered no such interference.  
We also explore the extent to which firms are able to transfer their ability to coordinate 
activity, either to a new domain or to a new member.  Our results indicate that tacit routines 
transfer more easily than explicit knowledge to a new, but closely related, domain.  However, 
routine-intensive firms perform slightly worse in their ability to incorporate new members, likely 
because tacit routines are less accessible to outsiders than is knowledge that can be explicitly 
communicated.
Naturally, the ideal setting for such work is real-world firms, where external validity is 
not an issue.  However, the very nature of tacit routines makes them difficult to observe in the 
real world (Hall 1993, Spender and Grant 1996).  In the laboratory, by contrast, we can 
exogenously vary the extent to which tacit routines are utilized by different firms, a task that 
would prove impossible among real-world firms.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that our 
work should serve as a complement for the study of the role of tacit routines in coordination in 
real-world firms.
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New pictures New employee Total
Routine-Intensive 8 (32) 12 (60) 20 (92)
Routine-Restricted 8 (32) 12 (60) 20 (92)
Total 16 (64) 24 (120) 40 (184)
Table 1.  Number of sessions (participants) by treatment
Initial 
coordination 
(periods 1-20)
Transfer to 
new domain
(periods 21-35)
Transfer to 
new employee
(periods 21-35)
Ln(Period)a
0.154***
(0.003)
0.071***
(0.004)
0.071***
(0.004)
0.140***
(0.006)
-0.140***
(0.006)
Routine-Intensive
0.060***
(0.018)
0.071***
(0.022)
0.060***
(0.019)
-0.030
(0.030)
-0.040
(0.027)
Period 20 profit
0.383***
(0.144)
0.660***
(0.277)
Constant
-0.047***
(0.015)
0.267***
(0.017)
0.106*
(0.063)
0.120***
(0.024)
-0.181
(0.128)
N(firms) 800 (40) 240 (16) 240 (16) 360 (24) 360 (24)
R2 0.653 0.507 0.581 0.474 0.517
Standard errors in parentheses
a – For regressions using periods 21-35, Ln(Period) is defined as Ln(Period – 20)
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01 
Table 2. Random-effects (firm) regressions of firm earnings
Average earnings in new 
domain (periods 21-24)
Average earnings by new 
employee (periods 21-24)
Average earnings 
(periods 1-4)
0.391
(0.229)
0.156
(0.226)
-0.108
(0.290)
-0.007
(0.291)
Routine-Intensive
0.083**
(0.036)
-0.045
(0.031)
Constant
0.313***
(0.029)
0.295***
(0.027)
0.222***
(0.034)
0.235***
(0.034)
N 16 16 24 24
R2 0.173 0.408 0.006 0.097
Standard errors in parentheses
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01 
Table 3. Firm performance in first four periods following change
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Period
Routine-Intensive (20 firms) Routine-Restricted (20 firms)
Figure 1. Average firm earnings in periods 1-20 (all firms)
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Figure 2. Average firm earnings in periods 21-35 (new domain treatment)
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Figure 3. Average new employee earnings in periods 21-35 (new employee treatment)
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Appendix: A model of coordination with explicit agreement and tacit routines
We present a simple formal model of a firm coordinating activity using tacit routines and 
explicit agreement.  This model – based on the presence of the two mechanisms for solving 
coordination problems – illustrates how limiting a firm’s ability to develop tacit routines will 
lead to greater reliance on explicit coordination mechanisms (communication and shared explicit 
knowledge), and the consequences for knowledge transfer to new individuals or related domains.
The model
Assume that a firm engages in T periods of “production” – where output refers to 
successful coordination (as in the identification of pictures in our task) – and that the firm’s 
production in any period  Tt ,...,1  is determined by a function, Y(Rt, Et), which uses as the two 
inputs the stock of tacit routines possessed by the firm in period t (Rt) and the amount of explicit 
shared agreement (Et).  Assume that Y is continuous and twice-differentiable in both arguments 
throughout.  Moreover, assume that Y is increasing in both arguments (i.e., Y1, Y2 > 0) and 
strictly concave in either argument (Y11, Y22 < 0).  Finally, assume that the marginal productivity 
of either input is decreasing in the quantity of the other input (i.e., Y12 = Y21 < 0).
23
Assume that the stock of explicit agreement in any period t is a function of the amount of 
explicit agreement in the previous period (Et-1) and the amount of communication in period t
(mt).  Thus, ),( 1 ttt mEGE  , where G is increasing in both arguments (i.e., G1, G2 > 0), weakly 
concave in previous shared agreement (G11 ≤ 0), and strictly concave in communication (G22 < 
                                                
23 An example of such a production function is 11  ttt ERYY , where Y  is a maximum attainable level of 
productivity.  This function corresponds quite closely to the payoff scheme in the experiments here (and in Weber 
and Camerer 2003) – for instance, with Y = $0.60.  The assumption of diminishing marginal productivity in all 
cases (i.e., all second derivatives are negative) is reasonable in a setting such as ours, where firm production (of 
“agreement” or coordination) has an upper bound. 
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0).  Since less communication is necessary when there is greater previously established explicit 
agreement, assume that the impact of period t communication on period t agreement is 
decreasing in the amount of pre-existing explicit agreement (G12 < 0).  Assume E0 corresponds to 
some basic body of explicit knowledge jointly held by the population from which firm members 
are drawn (such as commonly known facts and a common vocabulary).  Thus, holding E0
constant, greater explicit agreement in any period is obtained by having communicated more in 
previous periods (having established greater shared explicit knowledge) and by using more 
communication in the current period. 
In any period, the amount of communication mt is determined by the firm’s manager (and 
is the only choice variable for the firm).  Communication is costly, as determined by a function 
C(mt) that is strictly increasing and weakly convex throughout (i.e., C1 > 0, C11 ≥ 0).  
Thus, the firm’s profit in period t is given by
)()),(,(),( 1 tttttt mCmEGRYER   ,
and we assume that 0)(lim
0

 tm
mC
t
, so that some level of communication 0tm  is always 
optimal.
Finally, we discuss how the stock of tacit routines evolves over time.  Assume that such 
knowledge evolves with experience, but independently of communication.  Instead, as 
organizational scholars have noted (e.g., Gersick and Hackman 1990), tacit routines are likely to 
develop strongly when groups perform the same task repeatedly with little change in how the 
task is performed.  Therefore, we allow the variable z to refer to the degree of stability in firm 
operations and, for simplicity, allow z to take on one of two values, with z = 1 corresponding to
(stable) firms with no change in operations across time and z = 0 to firms that change.  We 
assume that the firm’s stock of tacit routines develops according to ),(0 ztFRRt  , where R0
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refers to a set of jointly held routines among the population from which firm members are drawn 
(for instance, tacit norms or rules governing communication).  
To capture the effect of experience on the development of tacit routines, we assume that 
F has the following four properties: 
i) F(1,0) = F(1,1) = 0 (the lack of shared experience in period 1 implies R1 = R0),
ii) F1 ≥ 0 (the stock of tacit routines is weakly increasing over time), 
iii) F2 > 0 for all t > 1 (with any experience, firms with stability in operations always 
have a greater stock of tacit routines), and 
iv) F12 ≥ 0 (the increase in tacit routines over time is always weakly larger in firms 
with stability in operations).
Firm performance in static environment
In this part of the analysis, we explore only the T periods in which firms perform the 
same production task repeatedly.  In the next section, we explore what happens in period T+1, 
when firms attempt to transfer knowledge and coordination ability to a new domain or employee.
A manager selects the vector of communication across periods  **1* ,, TmmM   to 
maximize profits (T tt ) for any 0 < δ ≤ 1.  Then the model produces several predictions 
regarding firm performance (profits) and firms’ use of explicit agreement and communication as 
a function of firm stability.  
The first result simply states that managers in all firms will engage in less communication 
over time.24
Proposition 1: The amount of communication will be strictly decreasing across periods. 
                                                
24 Proofs are available upon request.
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The intuition behind the result is simple: communication is most productive in earlier periods –
both because it creates knowledge “spillovers” for future periods and because the stock of tacit 
routines and explicit agreement are lower in earlier periods – while the cost of any given level of 
communication is constant across periods.  Thus, the manager will utilize more communication 
to coordinate activity in early periods and subsequently, having established a sufficiently large 
explicit knowledge base, will rely more on this knowledge base and less on communication to 
ensure coordination in later periods.  This holds regardless of whether z = 0 or z = 1.
Our second result deals with the key differences between the two kinds of firms.  
Proposition 2:  In any period, the amount of communication and explicit agreement will be 
lower and the profits will be higher in stable (z = 1) firms than in changing ones (z = 0). 
This result simply states that in the optimal communication sequences * 1zM and
*
0zM  it must be 
the case that * 1,
*
0,   ztzt mm  and * 1,* 0,   ztzt   in any period.25  The intuition behind this result is 
straightforward.  The stable firms (z = 1) obtain an advantage in their stock of tacit routines (i.e., 
0,1,   ztzt RR  for all t>1) that extends to all periods beyond the first.  This makes the 
productivity of all investments in communication higher for changing firms (even in the first 
period, because of the “spillovers” to future periods).  That is, managers of changing firms have 
more to gain – in terms of current period profits and future improvements explicit agreement –
by employing greater communication, while stable firm managers can engage in less 
communication, and rely less on explicit agreement, due to their natural advantage in tacit 
                                                
25 If managers are myopic – either in the sense that they maximize profits only in the current period, given Rt and Et-1
or that they fail to anticipate differences in how Rt and Et will evolve – then the result holds only for all periods after 
the first.  That is, myopic managers will engage in the same amount of communication in the first period (because 
managers in changing firms will not anticipate the greater marginal benefit to their firms of greater “investments” in 
explicit agreement).  In fact, our results suggest most managers are myopic in this sense (the first period 
communication and profits are almost identical for the two kinds of firms).
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routines.  Moreover, while changing firms spend more on communication, they never do so to an 
extent that overcomes the overall advantage held by stable firms (if this were the case, the 
managers of stable firms would invest in at least this much communication since it is (weakly) 
cheaper for them to do so).  Thus, stable firms will generate higher profits, and will always have 
lower levels of explicit agreement and communication, than changing ones.
Transferring knowledge
We now explore what happens when firms undergo change, in which case they have to 
transfer knowledge – either to a new and closely related domain or to a new individual.  We 
restrict our attention to period T+1, or the first period following the change.
In the case of transferring knowledge to a new domain, the firm’s profit function in 
period T+1 is identical to the profit function for previous periods:
)()),(,(),( 11111   TTTTTT mCmEGRYER .
In the case of transferring knowledge to a new employee, we assume that the production and 
profit functions are the same, representing the “production” of coordination between the manager 
and the new employee.26
The firm manager must then take RT+1 and ET as given and choose mT+1 to maximize 
profits in period T+1.
Since there is a difference between periods T and T+1 – either the change of domains or 
the introduction of a new employee – it is important to determine what happens to the stocks of 
tacit routines and explicit agreement as a result of this change.  We allow the parameter 0 ≤ βR ≤ 
                                                
26 We assume that these production and profit functions also apply to the continuing employees.  However, since the 
stocks of tacit routines and explicit agreement between the manager and continuing employees are unchanged by the 
introduction of a new employee, we ignore this aspect of the firm production – which is likely to continue as in all 
periods leading up to T – and instead focus only on the production of coordination between the manager and the new 
employee.  This is for simplicity.
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1 and 0 ≤ βE ≤1 to measure, respectively, the degree to which RT and ET transfer to the new 
situations.  Thus, βR = 1 implies that all of the stock of tacit routines transfers to the new domain, 
while βR = 0 implies that the entire stock of tacit routines is lost, and similarly for βE = 0 and βE = 
1 with respect to the stock of explicit agreement.
For the stock of tacit routines in period T+1, we then have ),1(01 zTFRR RT   , 
meaning that βR = 1 (full transfer) implies ),1(01 zTFRRT  , while βR = 0 (zero transfer) 
implies 01 RRT  .  Similarly, for the stock of shared explicit agreement, we 
have )),(( 001 tTET mEEEGE   , where βE = 1 (full transfer) implies ),(1 tTT mEGE   and 
βE = 0 (zero transfer) implies ),( 01 tT mEGE  .  We can then re-state the profit function for 
period T+1 as:
)())),((),,1((),,,( 1100011   TTTERERTT mCmEEEGzTFRYER 
Finally, we impose the following assumptions on βR and βE based on the kind of change 
experienced by the firm.
In the case of the firm entering a new, closely related domain, the basic features of the 
production of coordination remain the same, but the previously developed explicit agreement no 
longer applies.  We anticipate that tacit routines will transfer to the new context, due to the high 
similarity between what the firm does in both cases, but that explicit coordination mechanisms 
(domain-specific explicit knowledge) will not (Berry and Broadbent 1987, Gersick and Hackman 
1990, Cohen and Bacdayan 1994, Darr and Kurtzberg 2000).  Thus, in the case of a new domain, 
we assume that βR > 0 and βE = 0.
In the case of a new employee, we expect transfer will be nearly impossible for tacit 
routines, which are difficult to transfer to new individuals if not accompanied by explicit 
communication (Weber 2006).  However, explicit agreement, which is more easily 
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communicable due to its codifiable nature, will more easily transfer to the new employee 
(Nanaka 1991, 1994, Grant 1996, Argote and Ingram 2000, Lam 2000).  Thus, in the situation 
involving a new employee, we assume βR = 0 and βE > 0.
The following two results then hold as a direct consequence of the above assumptions 
and Proposition 2.
Proposition 3a:  When firms enter a new domain, profits will be higher in stable (z = 1) firms 
than in changing ones (z = 0). 
Proposition 3b:  When firms incorporate a new employee, profits for this employee will be lower
in stable (z = 1) firms than in changing ones (z = 0).
The intuition behind these two results is straightforward.  Entering the period in which the firm 
undergoes a change (T+1), the stable firms possess a greater stock of tacit routines and the 
changing firms possess a greater stock of explicit agreement.  The assumptions above tell us that 
each kind of knowledge will transfer to a positive degree in one situation and will not transfer at 
all in the other case.  Therefore, each of the two kinds of firms will have an advantage in dealing 
with one of the two kinds of change, and a disadvantage in dealing with the other.
